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Ground Water Quantity and 
Quality Management: Agricultural 
Production and Aquifer 
Salinization over Long Time Scales 
Keith C. Knapp and Kenneth A. Baerenklau 
An economic model of ground water salinization is developed. Starting from a full, 
high-quality aquifer, there is an initial extraction period, an intermediate waste 
disposal period, and  a final drainage period. Drainage management is  initially source 
control and reuse, but eventually culminates in evaporation basins and a system 
steady-state. This process  occurs over  long time scales but  is consistent  with 
historical observation. Efficiency is qualitatively similar to common property though 
quantitative magnitudes differ substantially. Regulatory pricing instruments are 
developed to support the efficient allocation. The system is not sustainable in that 
net returns generally decline through time until the steady-state. 
Key  words: common property, dynamic programming, efficiency, ground water, 
irrigation, salinity, sustainability 
Introduction 
Soil and  ground water salinity have contributed to the  decline and fall of several societies. 
Examples include ancient Mesopotamia (Jacobsen and Adams, 19581, the Vim Valley 
in Peru (Tanji, 1990), and the indigenous Hohokam people of the Salt River region in 
Arizona (Tanji). Currently, 10%-37% of arable lands worldwide are  salinelsodic (Tanji), 
including some 39% of the agriculturally productive land of California's San Joaquin 
Valley (Backlund and Hoppes, 1984). Other regions such as Israel, the Indus Plain, 
Australia, and Pakistan also suffer from salinity degradation (Wichelns, 1999). 
Although soil salinity has a substantially developed literature in economics [Dinar, 
Aillery, and  Moore (1993), and  Knapp (1999)  provide reviews]  ,ground water salinization 
has  received relatively scant attention by economists. Cummings (1971)  and  Cummings 
and  McFarland (1974)  propose conceptual frameworks with interpretations of efficiency 
conditions. Dinar (1994)  and Dinar and  Xepapadeas (1998)  simulate energy costs, surface 
water limits, and exogenous pump taxes for farms overlying a common property aquifer 
and for time horizons of two decades or less. Zeitouni and Dinar (1997)  consider a two- 
aquifer system where subsurface flows from a high-salinity aquifer degrade a low-salinity 
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aquifer, while Reinelt (2005) develops a computational model of seawater intrusion due 
to irrigated agriculture. Several studies consider ground water degradation from other 
pollutants (e.g., Conrad and Olson, 1992; Kim et al., 1997; Zeitouni, 1991; Fleming, 
Adams, and Ervin, 1998);  however, this literature typically considers only waste emis- 
sions and water quality, and not extractions and water table dynamics.' Roseta-Palma 
(2002) develops an  insightful theoretical analysis of ground water quantity and quality, 
but unlike the analysis here assumes a natural regenerative capacity for the pollutant 
and focuses on the steady-state.' 
This paper develops a long-term economic-hydrologic  model of agriculturally  induced 
ground water salinization. The agricultural production model includes choice variables 
for land allocation, crop type, applied water depth, and irrigation source. This model is 
coupled to an aquifer model with endogenous water table height and salt mass. In 
contrast to the vast majority of previous work, biophysical relations in the model are 
specified so that a complete mass balance accounting of water and salt flows in the  basin 
is maintained. The model is quite general and can be used to understand a wide variety 
of  natural resource and environmental quality issues faced by irrigated agriculture. 
Here we concentrate specifically on the problems of salinization over long time scales, 
efficient management in the presence of both pumping cost and salt externalities, and 
development of  supporting policy instruments with an application to Kern County, a 
major agricultural region in the San Joaquin Valley of Calif~rnia.~ 
The results demonstrate that the  ground water system can evolve rather slowly in the 
quality dimension and rather quickly in the quantity dimension, and that it exhibits 
interesting transition dynamics which would be omitted from a steady-state analysis. 
We also find benefits from ground water management that are considerably larger than 
previous studies for both this basin (Dixon, 1989; Knapp and Olson, 1995) as well as 
most other basins (Koundouri, 2004). Some sensitivity analysis is reported to further 
understand the determinants of these benefits. State-dependent price instruments are 
also developed to induce efficient ground water use. These are  quite nonlinear due to the 
combined effects ofwater table dynamics, soil-plant-water relationships, and hydrologic 
balance constraints. Overall, the analysis suggests greater efforts to manage ground 
water than recommended by earlier economic studies. 
Agriculture and Aquifer Salinization 
Aquifers in irrigated agricultural regions can be salinized by a variety of mechanisms, 
including naturally occurring salts in the  parent aquifer material, surface water impor- 
tation, lateral flows from an adjacent saline aquifer, salt water intrusion, and lack of 
sufficient drainage. Here we consider salinization due to both imports of surface water 
(which naturally contain at least some salts), and restricted drainage. These are the 
predominant mechanisms in the study area here, but they also are relevant to under- 
standing historical salinity problems as well as preventing and/or mitigating current 
problems in most irrigated agricultural environments. 
Empirical studies by Bernardo et  al. (1993)  and Taghavi, Howitt, and Marino (1994)  consider water table elevation and 
water quality for nitrates and pesticides. 
Salts can precipitate out of solution, thus moderating salt concentrations, but they remain in the system and would 
reappear in solution if aqueous salt concentrations decline. 
Throughout the paper, "efficient management" refers to maximizing the present value of net benefits. 6 18  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Figure 1  illustrates the conceptual problem. An irrigated agricultural region overlies 
a ground water aquifer of initially high quality (low salinity)  and  with a relatively small 
amount of natural recharge. Water for irrigation is obtained either by pumping ground 
water or by importing surface water, some of which is lost to the aquifer via leakage 
from the canal system. The total amount of arable land is fured and subject to crop rota- 
tion and marketing constraints, but land allocation is endogenous. Land areas may be 
used for crop production with either surface or ground water, left fallow, or used for 
disposal of  saline ground water via evaporation ponds.4 Such ponds have been and 
continue to be used in the San  Joaquin Valley and in other naturally drainage-limited 
agricultural regions. The quantities of surface and ground water applied to each crop 
are also endogenous. 
Although the imported surface water is  high quality (low salinity), it  does contain some 
salts, as  does all irrigation water. Crop evapotranspiration (ET)  removes large quantities 
of applied water from the rootzone with negligible salt uptake, thus concentrating salts 
in the rootzone. Some irrigation water is not used by the crop and percolates to the 
aquifer, thereby removing salts from the rootzone. These deep percolation flows arise 
partly from salt leaching requirements for crop growth but mostly from non-uniform 
irrigati~n.~  In addition, both water and salt flows must satisfy regional mass balance 
restrictions governed by physical processes that are calibrated for Kern County. These 
include the evaporation rate for pond water disposal, the aquifer-specific yield, and 
pressure-induced drawdown at ground water wells. Finally, the water table must be 
maintained at a level conducive to crop growth, as high water tables can inhibit plant 
growth via poor aeration andlor increased soil salinity. 
Economic-Hydrologic Model of a Saline Aquifer 
Annual net benefits from crop production in year t are given by: 
where xij, is per acre net returns, xij, are cropped areas,  xpt  is evaporation pond area, y,, 
is total surface water cost, y,,  is total ground water cost, yp is the unit (area) cost for 
evaporation ponds, i E {s,g]  denotes irrigation  water source, and  j E (1, ..., nl denotes crop 
type. Here both cotton (relatively salt-tolerant) and tomatoes (relatively salt-sensitive) 
are  considered due to their predominance in the region and profitability. The irrigation 
system is furrow with %-mile runs representing the standard system in Kern County 
and elsewhere. All monetary values are  in 2000 dollars, and the interest rate r = 4%. 
Another possibility would be to blend surface and ground water sources to irrigate a single crop but, consistent with field 
observations, Kan, Schwabe, and Knapp (2002, p. 34) find that "blending two heterogeneous sources of irrigation water is 
an  unlikely solution from an  efficiency perspective." Knapp and Dinar (1984)  and Dinar, Letey, andVaux(1986) derive similar 
results. Despite their finding that surface water scarcity can lead to blending, Ken,  Schwabe, and Knapp conclude such 
constraints are "likely to lead to profit-maximizing solutions consisting of corner solutions" (p. 34). Therefore, we delineate 
land use by both crop type and irrigation water source. 
5All  irrigation water contains salts. Salt leaching refers to the downward movement of salts in deep percolation flows away 
from the crop rootzone. Without leaching, salts accumulate in the rootzone, and eventually crop production is no longer 
possible. Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  61 9 
Canal Percolation 
Figure 1. Regional agricultural production with surface water supply and 
overlying an aquifer system with salinity (q = water quantity, c = salt 
concentration, e = evaporationltranspiration,  h = hydraulic head, and s = 
aquifer salt mass) 
Prices for outputs and non-water inputs are constant over the horizon. Clearly this 
will not be the case in the long run, but incorporating general equilibrium effects andlor 
time trends for these variables is not necessary to establish the main results and would 
complicate the model significantly. Per acre net returns are xijt  = (p, + p,  - yhy,,)yijt  - 
yh,  jpjyi,t - yhj  - y,,  where yijt  is crop yield, pj  is crop price, pa, is other sources of revenue 
(i.e., seed credit for cotton), y,,,,  y,,,,  and yhj are yield, revenue (i.e., Cotton Board 
assessment), and harvest costs, respectively, and yj is production costs other than water 
and evaporation pond costs. Production costs y,  include capital recovery costs; irrigation 
system purchase and operating and maintenance costs (O&M), including taxes, insur- 
ance, and estimated repair costs; and planting, cultivation, fertilization, and pesticide 
application costs. Output prices and values for these cost parameters are summarized 
in table 1. 
Crop-water production relationships are specified using functional forms and the data- 
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Table 1. Agricultural Production Parameter Values 
Parameter  Description  Units  Cotton  Tomatoes 
P  Output price  [$ ton-']  1,661.09  57.61 
Po  Other income  [$ acre-' yr-'I  75.19  0 
Yh  Harvest costs (area)  [$  acre-' yr-'1  63.70  54.86 
yh~  Harvest costs (yield)  [$  ton-']  12.53  13.25 
Yhr  Harvest costs (revenue)  [$  $-'I  0.005  0 
Y  Production costs  [$ acre-' yr-'I  584  692.54 
h,  Rootzone depth  [R.  I  5  5 
Notes: Monetary  values are in 2000 dollars. Economic data  are from Kan, Schwabe, and Knapp(2002)  and sources 
therein, with adjustment for inflation as necessary. 
where ylit is crop yield, eijt  is evapotranspiration (with lower and upper bounds given by 
the  parameters gj and ej), cit and wijt  are the salt concentration [decisiemens  per meter 
(dSIm)] and depth of  applied irrigation water (ft/yr), and each 4 is a parameter. Mass 
balance restrictions give definitions for deep percolation flows (ft/yr) and salt concen- 
trations for each land use: dijt  wijt -  eijt  and ctt - cit  wijt  Idijt  assuming steady-state  con- 
ditions in the ro~tzone.~  Parameter estimates are reported in table 2, while cotton yields 
and deep percolation flows are illustrated in figure 2 for several salt concentrations and 
applied water depths. The qualitative properties of this figure will help explain some of 
the empirical results as discussed later. 
Evaporation ponds provide drainage disposal to maintain the water table at an accept- 
able level for crop production. Pond construction costs are annualized and denoted on 
a per unit area basis by y,;  however, pond area displaces crop area, implying an addi- 
tional opportunity cost that is endogenous to the model. This opportunity cost reflects 
land use for productive crops and can greatly outweigh explicit pond costs in regions 
with high-value agricultural production. With the above definitions, total land use is 
constrained by 
where f = 0.9 million acres is the total land available for agricultural production in the 
study region. An additional rotation and marketing constraint is imposed that requires 
total tomato acreage to be no more than one-half of  total cotton acreage. 
Several studies in the soil salinity economics literature find convergence to a steady-state in approximately 4-7  years 
(Dinar  and Knapp, 1986; Dinar, Aillery, and Moore, 1993; Letey and Knapp, 1995).  Because thisis one to two orders of  magni- 
tude faster than the time required to investigate ground water salinity issues, it is reasonable to assume steady-state  soil 
salinity. This implies the useful result that the salt mass in applied irrigation water equals the salt mass in deep percolation 
flows during each time period. Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  62  1 
Table 2. Crop-Water Production Function Parameter Values [equations  (2) 
and (3)l 
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Source: Estimated by the authors using the data-generating model in Kan, Schwabe, and Knapp (2002). 
Surface water in Kern County is relatively high quality (low salinity) and comes from 
three major sources: the California State  Water Project, the federal Central Valley 
Project, and the Kern River. Total surface water imports are: 
where p,  = 0.3 accounts for percolation losses from the canal system to the aquifer. 
Surface water has a constant salt concentration c,  =  E, consistent with the study area, 
although inflow salt  concentrations can increase over time in some regions (Characklis, 
Griffin, and Bedient, 2005). Surface water costs are estimated from data in Vaux (1986) 
and Kern County Water Agency (1998)  with inflation adjustment, and reflect differen- 
tial costs of alternate sources within the region. These costs are: 
where diversions are subject to an  upper bound qst  = 1.8 million acre-feet (maf)  per year, 
reflecting water deliveries in a normal year (Kern County Water Agency, 1998). 
Ground water extractions are 
where drainage flows (q,, ,)  equal the Kern County atmospheric evaporation rate times 
pond area q,,, - epxp,.  Pumping costs are: 
where y,,  denotes well and pump capital costs calculated on a per unit basis, ye are 
energy costs for lifting water, his  land surface elevation relative to mean sea level 
(MSL),  ht denotes water table elevation (hydraulic head), h, denotes drawdown (the 622  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Figure 2. Cotton crop-water production function: yield (y), and deep 
percolation depth (d)  and salt concentration  (c,) as functions of applied 
water depth (w)  and salt concentration (c) Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  623 
Table 3. Evaporation Pond, Surface Water, and Aquifer Parameter Values 
Parameter  Description  Units  Value 
e~  Pond evaporation rate  [fi  yr-'I  5.32 
YP  Evaporation pond costs  [$ acre-' yr-'I  122.59 
PS  Surface water infiltration coefficient  NIA  0.3 
Pst  Maximum surface water flow  [maf yr-'I  1.8 
Cs  Surface water salt concentration  [dS  m-'I  0.7 
Ygk  Well and pump O&M costs 
Ye  Energy cost 
h,  Pump drawdown (cone of depression)  [Rl  60 
A  Aquifer area  [ lo6  acres]  1.29 
- 
h  Land surface elevation  [R above MSL]  385 
!!  Minimum hydraulic head (aquifer bottom)  [R  above MSL]  -233 
s~  Aquifer-specific yield  [ maflmaf  I  0.13 
o  Natural recharge  [mafyr-'I  0.052 
Notes: Monetary values are in 2000 dollars. Data sources, with adjustment for inflation as necessary, are as 
follows: pond data are from Kan, Schwabe, and Knapp (2002) and sources therein; energy cost of ground water 
pumping is calculated from the California Public Utility Commission rate schedule (March 4, 2002); well and 
pump costs, drawdown, and aquifer geophysical data are from Knapp et  al. (2003). 
depth of the cone of depression) at  the  well, A is the regional aquifer area, and sY is the 
aquifer-specific yield. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (5)  accounts for 
capital costs and pumping costs associated with lifting water from the  initial water table 
height at  the  beginning of year t.  The second term accounts for increasing pumping costs 
due to the declining water table height during year t.  Other surface water and aquifer 
parameter values and data sources are given in table 3. 
The ground water system evolves through time in both quantity and quality dimen- 
sions. In the quantity dimension, the water table height evolves according to: 
where w  = natural recharge, and all other terms are as defined previously. Equation (6) 
states  that  natural recharge plus percolation from both canal losses and irrigation cause 
the water table to rise, while extractions for irrigation and drainage cause it to fall. 
Letting h, = rootzone depth, the water table must lie within the internal h 5  ht < h - h, 
representing the lower aquifer boundary and the maximum elevation for feasible crop 
production, respectively. The lower aquifer bound limits ground water extractions to the 
available supply, while the upper bound limits net deep percolation flows to available 
storage capacity.7 
This constraint follows from the obsemation that, with high water tables and sufficiently  low hydraulic conductivities, 
deep percolation generated by a farm can damage that farm for some time, even if neighboring farms are not also doing the 
same. This assumption is quite realistic for Kern County, but it may not be if lateral transmissivities are high enough and 
farming units are small enough such that the damage caused by deep percolation at  a farm is largely borne by other farms. 624  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
At the beginning of each time period, ground water salt concentration is calculated 
as cgt  5 stl(AsY(ht  -  h)),  assuming uniform salt mixing in the aquifer as befits the long 
time scales considered here. In  the  quality dimension, assuming steady-state conditions 
in the rootzone, and letting c,  denote salt concentration ofnatural recharge, aquifer salt 
mass evolves according to: 
Here, surface flows and natural recharge bring salts into the system, while disposal via 
evaporation ponds removes salts from the system. Salt flows due to irrigation with 
ground water and deep percolation exactly cancel under steady-state rootzone condi- 
tions, and therefore do not appear in the mass balance described by equation (7). 
Decision Rules and Transition Dynamics: 
Common Property 
Given the model and empirical specification defined above, we now consider evolution 
of the aquifer system as an unregulated common property resource. With many rela- 
tively small users, the effect of an  individual user's current decisions on future aquifer 
characteristics is borne almost entirely by others. Therefore it is reasonable to assume 
that under such conditions each user acts to maximize profits in each period without 
regard for future  values of the state  variables, rather  than maximizing the  present value 
of profits over multiple time periods (which we consider next). This is consistent with 
the Gisser and Sanchez (1980) pumping cost model.' 
The common property optimization problem is solved using MINOS (Murtagh and 
Saunders, 1998).  During each time period there are  nine decision  variables: four cropped 
areas (cottonltomatoes irrigated with surfacelground water), four applied water depths 
(one  for each cropped area),  and the evaporation pond area; and two state  variables: the 
water table height and the aquifer salt mass (or concentration). Consistent with the 
above reasoning, the decision variables are chosen to maximize annual net benefits in 
each year given the current values of  the state variables and subject to the land and 
rotation constraints presented in the previous section. This is then simulated forward 
in time to generate time-series values. 
Figure 3 shows the optimal decision rules for applied surface water [(I  - P,)  q,,], 
applied ground water 
and evaporation pond area as  hndions ofthe two aquifer state  variables. Applied surface 
water is at the maximum level over a quadrilateral representing low ground water 
quantity (low  hydraulic head),  low quality (high  salt concentration),  or both. Beyond this 
region, surface water is decreasing in both ground water quantity and quality. Ground 
Game theory models of non-saline ground water use include Negri (1989) and Provencher and Burt (1993). Dixon (1989) 
and Gardner,  Moore, and Walker (1997)  suggest the game-theoretic solution is  essentially identical to the Gisser and Sanchez 
(1980) competitive model when there are more than a half-dozen or so users. The Census Bureau reports that in 1997 there 
were almost 2,000 farms in Kern County overlying a common aquifer, with two-thirds of them each covering less than 500 
acres. Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  625 
Applied Surface  Water [(l-  P,) q,,] (maf  lyr) 
Applied Ground Water [qgoSt]  (maflyr) 
Evaporation Pond Area [x,,,] (lo6  acres) 
Figure 3. Common property decision rules: Applied surface water, 
ground water, and pond area as functions of h, = hydraulic head 
(feet above MSL), and c,,  = aquifer salt concentration (dS/m) 626  December ZOO6  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
water extractions for agriculture are zero for low water tables andlor high salt concen- 
trations. Extractions are generally increasing in hydraulic head; however, the relation 
to salt concentration is more complicated. Increased salt concentration typically leads 
to increased extractions, but in some circumstances the opposite can occur. The explan- 
ation can be seen from the  production functions in figure 2. Increased salt concentration 
for a given water application level typically increases the marginal product ofwater (due 
to additional rootzone leaching and dilution), and hence induces increased water appli- 
cation rates. However, at a low water application rate and a high salt concentration, 
increasing the salt concentration can lower the marginal product of  water, thereby 
inducing decreased application rates. Finally, figure 3 shows that only a small amount 
of land is allocated to evaporation ponds for any combination of aquifer state variables, 
reflecting the  high cost of ponds for disposal relative to source control (i.e., limiting deep 
percolation flows) and reuse (i.e., using saline ground water to irrigate relatively salt- 
tolerant crops). 
Figures 4 and 5 display simulated time-series results for the control and state vari- 
ables and annual net benefits under common property (CP). (Efficiency results in the 
figures are  discussed later.) Initial conditions for these simulations include a completely 
full aquifer (h,  = 360 feet above MSL) and an initial salt concentration of c,,  = 1  dS/m. 
Figure 4a depicts hydraulic head and suggests there are three distinct regimes for 
ground water use. The first is labeled the Resource Extraction era. Here ground water 
is relatively abundant  and  high-quality, so extractions exceed deep percolation flows and 
the water table falls. As the water table falls, pumping costs increase and the salt 
concentration rises (figure 4b) due to increasing salt mass from water imports and the 
concentrating effect of  reduced volume. These effects tend to reduce ground water 
extractions over time (figure 5). Eventually, deep percolation flows exceed ground water 
extractions (around year 200) and the water table begins to rise. This new regime is 
called the Waste Disposal era: although beneficial extractions still occur, these extrac- 
tions are outweighed by deep percolation flows. Figure 4b shows that ground water salt 
concentration continues to rise during this second era, as well. 
In the  third and final stage (Drainage era),  the water table is at  its maximum height. 
For irrigation to continue, hydrologic balance must be maintained by balancing deep 
percolation flows with ground water extractions. Initially this is accomplishedvia source 
control and reuse (figure 5): at approximately year 1,150, there is a discrete drop in 
surface water acreage and applied depth and a discrete increase in ground water 
acreage. During this period, however, aquifer salt concentration is still rising, making 
reuse increasingly less attractive as a solution. Consequently, a point is reached where 
evaporation ponds are  the desired disposal option: at approximately year 1,750, surface 
water area increases while ground water area decreases. At this point the system is 
stabilized, all variables remain constant thereafter, and the economic value of  the 
aquifer to the production system is exhausted. 
Figure 4c depicts aggregate annual net benefits for common property use. Annual net 
benefits initially decline through time as the water table falls, pumping costs increase, 
and ground water quality decreases. This occurs until the water table turning point at 
about year 200, after which annual net benefits then slightly increase through time due 
to the rising water table. Although ground water quality is substantially degraded at 
this point, the benefits of reduced pumping costs outweigh the costs of reduced ground 
water quality, and thus annual net benefits increase. Once the Drainage era  is reached, Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  627 
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Water Table 
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Groundwater  Salt 
Concentration 
I  1,  Annual  Net BeneJits 
-  Common Property  - - - - Efficiency 
Figure 4. Time paths for water table elevation, ground water salt 
concentration, and annual net benefits under common property 
and efficient management 628  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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annual net benefits fall as aquifer salt concentration increases until a steady-state is 
reached with the onset of evaporation ponds. The common property system therefore is 
not sustainable in the sense of maintaining or improving incomes over time. Note also 
that net benefits are expected to drop by over 50% during the simulation. 
Our interest is in providing a relatively complete analysis of the productionlaquifer 
system starting from an originally full, high-quality aquifer and sufficiently long to 
achieve a steady-state. For the particular empirical setting here, this is a long time 
frame; however, it is consistent with the historical salinity problems noted at the 
outset-for  example, irrigation initiated approximately 6,000 BC in Mesopotamia with 
development of city-states during the ensuing three millenia (Scarre, 1993). Jacobsen 
and Adams  (1958) note the decline in agricultural  productivity  due to salinity in 
southern Mesopotamia during the  period 2400 BC-1700  BC.'  In  the  Viru Valley of Peru, 
irrigation systems were developed during the period 400 BC-0  BC; population peaked 
in 800 AD, with a precipitous decline after 1200 AD  attributed at  least in part to rising 
soil salinity and water tables (Tanji, 1990).  Tanji also cites the Hohokam Indians in the 
Salt River region of Arizona during the period 300 BC-1450  AD. Records reveal crop 
damages caused by water logging and salinization on the valley floor, with no record of 
habitation after this period. 
In other settings the time frame involved could be considerably less. For example, 
regions with a smaller aquifer depth andlor higher salt concentration of imported surface 
water could experience more rapid salt build-up. Another major determinant is initial 
aquifer conditions, a prominent example being the west side of the San Joaquin Valley 
where the parent material for soils and the aquifer material was marine in origin and 
contained considerable salts when production began. Consequently, that portion of the 
valley is subject to severe salinityldrainage problems despite agriculture of the same or 
less duration than Kern County. Nevertheless, both the model and results are still of 
interest, as  that problem corresponds to the time-series results with a high water table 
and salt concentration.1° 
Efficient Use 
Economic efficiency for the aquifer maximizes the present value of net benefits 
subject to the definitions, constraints, and equations of motion as  before, and where 
a = 1/(1 + r) is the discount factor and r = 4%. Again there are nine control variables 
(four water application rates and five land areas)  and two state  variables (hydraulic 
'Archival  records indicate the visible presence of salinity in fields previously known to be salt-free, there was a discernible 
shift in crops from less salt-tolerant  wheat to more salt-tolerant  barley, and wheat yields declined by some 65%.  Salt  build-up 
is  attributed to seepage and over-imgation  contributing tohigh water tables in the presence oflow permeability soils, eventu- 
ally leading to land abandonment (Jacobsen and Adams, 1958; Gelburd, 1985). 
'O Technology can clearly change over the time horizons reported here; however, there are  inherent limits to crop salt toler- 
ance and irrigation system efficiencies, implying that all the processes evaluated here will still be relevant. In addition, 
population and income growth can imply increased food demand matching or exceeding technological development. Conse- 
quently, we feel it is of  interest to analyze the time-autonomous problem as a baseline case. We also point out that the 
constant parameter assumption analyzed here is completely consistent with other infinite horizon studies in economic 
dynamics as  well as  previous literature on ground water quantity and quality (e.g., Roseta-Palma, 2002). 630  December 2006  Journal of Agricullwral and Resource Economics 
head and aquifer salt concentration). This problem is solved using dynamic program- 
ming. The value function (optimized objective function) is defined by 
V(hl,sl) = max  Eatxt , 
lw;,x;l I  t=l  I 
where h, and s, are the initial aquifer height and salt mass, w, and x, are the decision 
vectors for applied water and land areas, respectively, and the optimization is subject 
to relations (1)-(7) and associated definitions and bounds. The value function V must 
satisfy Bellman's form: 
where  TC is annual  net benefits as (implicitly)  defined by equations (1)-(5) and associated 
definitions, and g is a vector function which gives hydraulic head and aquifer salt mass 
in the next period as  functions of the state and control variables. The vector function g 
is defined by the equations of motion (6) and (7). 
Equation (8)  is a functional equation in the unknown value function and follows from 
standard arguments in the dynamic programming literature (Bertsekas, 1976; Judd, 
1998). Also note that the optimal decision rules are the solution to the control optimi- 
zation problem on the  right-hand side of (8)  and are  functions of the statevariables.  This 
optimization problem differs from common property where users maximize current net 
benefits [the first term on the right-hand side of  equation (811 while ignoring future 
impacts on hydraulic head and aquifer salt concentration (accounted for by the second 
term), implying common property is inefficient. 
Bellman's equation (8)  is solved for the  value function and associated optimal decision 
rules using a successive approximation algorithm (value function iteration)  after discret- 
izing the aquifer state space (Bertsekas, 1976;  Judd, 1998).  The overall structure of this 
algorithm is standard. The algorithm is first initialized by assuming an initial estimate 
of  the value function which is identically zero. At the beginning of  each iteration, a 
smooth estimate of the value function is created from the current estimate of the value 
function as  described below. This smooth approximation is  inserted into the right-hand 
side of Bellman's equation (8), and the control optimization problem indicated in (8)  is 
solved for every point in state-space. This yields a new estimate of the  value function for 
the  next iteration. This procedure is  repeated until the algorithm converges, after  which 
it  is straightforward to calculate the optimal decision rules and associated optimal time 
paths. 
As in all dynamic programming problems, several implementation issues arise. The 
control optimization problems in (8) at  each point in state-space are solved using 
MINOS (Murtagh and  Saunders, 1998),  which is an  established and  widely used general 
purpose solver. Consequently, a smooth approximation to the  value function is needed, 
as  MINOS uses gradient-based procedures. Standard polynomials such as  quadratic or 
cubic are  not necessarily shape-preserving and can distort the successive approximation 
process (Judd, 1998)-which  has also been our experience on other problems. Accord- 
ingly, we use a bicubic spline (Press et al., 1992; Judd, 1998) to approximate the value 
function. A bicubic spline is a function consisting of piecewise polynomials where each 
polynomial holds over a region of the function domain (here, the state-space grid). The Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  63  1 
polynomials are third order and are estimated so that they fit the estimated value 
function points exactly and have continuous derivatives everywhere, including the cell 
boundaries between each polynomial. 
To further increase computational efficiency and preserve shape, the derivatives of 
the  value function being estimated in each iteration are also computed at  each point in 
the state-space along with the level values. These derivative estimates utilize the 
envelope theorem and shadow values from the control optimization problems. Both the 
computed level values and derivatives for the value function estimate at  each point in 
state-space are used as inputs to create an exact-fit bicubic spline approximation. This 
serves as  the smooth approximation for the  value function to be used on the  right-hand 
side of Bellman's equation (8).11 
Figure 4 shows that the efficient time paths are qualitatively similar to the common 
property solution but exhibit significant quantitative differences. Hydraulic head under 
economic efficiency follows the  U-shaped path to a steady-state as previously observed, 
but remains at  significantly higher levels and reaches the steady-state maximum level 
sooner. Although the  aquifer salt concentration increases through time, as  in the  common 
property solution, the rate of  increase is somewhat less and the steady-state level is 
approximately 20%  lower. Efficient annual net benefits are  generally declining until the 
steady-state as in common property, but they are generally higher than previously 
observed. The difference can be quite substantial, amounting to $67 acre-' yr-' in the 
steady-state,  for example. Basin-wide annualized net benefits are $552 and $530 million1 
year under efficiency and common property, respectively. 
Efficient time paths for the decision variables are not illustrated, asthey have the 
same qualitative properties as common property in terms of shape. However, the time- 
series paths  do  differ  quantitatively.  To  briefly  summarize the differences,  after 
approximately year 200, land areas irrigated with surface water are more stable under 
efficiency than common property: they are lower during the intermediate time periods 
but slightly higher during the steady-state. Surface water applied depths generally 
exceed those under common property by up to 1  ftlyr. Land areas irrigated with ground 
water are significantly less than common property in the initial years, but roughly 
comparable afterward. Applied ground water depths are initially comparable to those 
under common property, but during the intermediate periods they can exceed the 
common property solution by up to 0.5 ftlyr or more. This is presumably due to the 
higher water table and lower aquifer salt  concentration during the  intermediate periods. 
Another significant quantitative difference is that evaporation ponds are  initiated earlier 
under efficiency. This is the primary mechanism for maintaining the lower aquifer salt 
concentration under efficiency. 
As implied by the preceding results, efficient management restricts ground water 
withdrawals in the early periods in order to achieve a higher water table than would 
otherwise occur. This reduces pumping costs and also dilutes the aquifer salt concentra- 
tion. Later, evaporation ponds stabilize the aquifer salt concentration at lower levels 
than otherwise would occur. These actions contribute to a higher level of annual net 
"  The bicubic spline results in an algebraic system of the unknown coefficients given the finite set of level values and 
associated derivatives for  the function to  be  approximated (here, the value function) and given the requirements for 
continuous  derivatives along the boundaries of the individual polynomials. This system can be solved by efficient algorithms 
as discussed by Press et al. (1992) and Judd (1998). These references provide excellent discussions of bicubic splines and 
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benefits in the basin over the majority of the time horizon (CP  net benefits exceed those 
under efficiency for the first seven years). Ultimately, the differences occur because 
efficient ground water withdrawals are chosen to reflect both current net benefits and 
future impacts, while common property considers only the former. Thus, efficient use 
can be viewed as an investment whereby growers forego early returns in exchange for 
higher returns later, with the net effect being positive. 
Aquifer Management Benefits 
Common property is theoretically inefficient  because it  ignores future  impacts of current 
decisions, and the above results demonstrate potentially large empirical disparities. 
However, whether or not the resource should be actively managed depends in part on 
management benefits defined as  the difference between the present values of common 
property and efficiency. Starting with Gisser and Sanchez (1980), a substantial litera- 
ture has found that  management benefits are  typically modest but, as  noted previously, 
this literature has focused on pumping cost externalities  without consideration of water 
quality.12  For the region here, annualized management benefits are $25.62 acre-' yr-'. 
Compared with the results summarized in table 4 (which consider only water quantity), 
this is significantly larger than previous estimates for both this basin and other western 
U.S. ground water basins (save one which is almost identical). 
Although the model developed here differs from previous studies in both the study 
area and parameter values, sensitivity analysis in the previous studies typically does 
not find large changes in management benefits either across regions or due to reason- 
able changes in parameter values (Koundouri, 2004). Consequently, the question 
arises as  to whether the  larger benefits reported here are due to water quality (salinity). 
This was investigated with an equivalent non-saline model, where ground water salt 
concentration is maintained at  a constant value equal to surface water salt concentra- 
tion over the horizon. Management benefits with no salinity are $24.58 acre-' yr",  or 
almost the same as reported with salinity. This finding is understandable given that 
salinization occurs over a relatively long time scale, and discounting reduces the impor- 
tance of the far future, as  emphasized in the sustainability literature (Portney and 
Weyant, 1999). 
Table 5 further explores management benefits as influenced by initial conditions. 
Here various points along the CP time path are selected as starting points for both CP 
and efficiency to estimate management benefits under different initial conditions. While 
management benefits are  influenced by the starting point, in no case do they exceed the 
values reported above by any substantial amount. While salinity does not dramatically 
affect management benefits, it does seem crucial for an overall understanding of  the 
ground water problem. As an example, in the non-saline case, hydraulic head converges 
to a steady-state  near the  bottom of the aquifer (-230 ft MSL), while in the saline model, 
hydraulic head never falls below 10 ft MSL and eventually converges to a steady-state 
at  the upper aquifer bound. Thus it would not be possible to understand the long-run 
aquifer dynamics without accounting for aquifer salinization. 
12 Based on a survey of 15 studies, Koundouri (2004)  reports management benefits range from 0.01% to 409.4% of common 
property welfare, with a median value of 3%. Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  633 
Table 4. Estimated  Management Benefits for Western U.S. Ground Water Basins 
Estimated Ground Water 
Management Benefits " 
Location  ($ acre-' yr-')  References 
Kern County (California)  11.67, 8.341  Dixon (1989); Feinerman and Knapp (1983); 
Knapp and Olson (1995); Knapp et  al. (2003) 
Madera County (California)  10.55, 3.291  Provencher (1993); Provencher and Burt (1994) 
Yolo County (California)  25.52  Noel, Gardner, and Moore (1980) 
Pecos Basin (New Mexico)  [O.OO,  0.041  Gisser and Sanchez (1980); 
Allen and Gisser (1984) 
Ogallala (New Mexico)  [0.01, 7.031  Brill and Burness (1994); 
Burness and Brill (2001) 
Ogallala (Texas High Plains)  [0.02,  0.091  Nieswiadomy (1985); Kim et al. (1989) 
Note: All monetary values have been adjusted for inflation, and are in 2000 dollars. 
"Values in brackets [I  represent the range of  estimated values from low to high when there are multiple studies 
for the region. 
Table 5. Aquifer Management Benefits Under Alternate Initial Conditions 
hesent  Value of Net Benefits 
Management 
h  o  Cgo  Common Property  Efficiency  Benefits 
(ft MSL)  (dS/m)  ($/acre)  ($/acre)  ($ acre-' yr-') 
360  1  586.0  612.3  26.3 
0  5  422.3  434.7  12.4 
130  10  417.9  433.7  15.8 
280  13  442.8  466.1  24.7 
Note: The variables h, and c,,  are defined as initial hydraulic head and aquifer salt concentration,  respectively. 
Aquifer salinization is also likely important for long-run sustainable resource man- 
agement. As emphasized in the sustainability literature (Portney and Weyant, 19991, 
discounting reduces the importance of the far future. Under sustainability and reduced 
emphasis on discounting,  then the differences between CP and efficiency in the physical 
variables and annual net benefits farther out in time are likely to become much more 
significant, and hence the importance of  accounting for aquifer salinization may also 
increase. These observations are heightened by  the historical evidence cited at the 
outset which implicates soil and aquifer salinization as contributors to the downfall of 
several civilizations. 
Externalities and Policy Instruments 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that there are significant benefits associated with 
managing the aquifer to achieve efficiency. But what is less obvious is specifically how 
efficiency might be  attained through policy intervention. Any  successful policy must 
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to the  aquifer generate an  unambiguously negative externality. However, ground water 
withdrawals generate a negative externality in the classic case analyzed in the literature 
(declining water table leading to increased pumping costs), but they also can generate 
a positive externality in the saline aquifer case either by lowering a high water table 
and thereby mitigating drainage problems, or by reducing aquifer salt mass via pond 
disposal. In general, there are a variety of  policy instruments for alleviating nonpoint 
pollution (Griffin and  Bromley, 1982).  Quantity  regulation andfor  market establishment 
policies are reasonably straightforward from the preceding results. The remainder of 
this section addresses the design of a pricing policy to manage the aquifer. 
The model defined by equations (1)-(7) and associated definitions contains a poten- 
tially large number of decision variables for land area and applied water depths, and in 
general it would not be tractable to define price instruments for each of these micro- 
activities. Inspection of the equations of motion, however, indicates hydraulic head and 
aquifer salt concentration depend only on aggregate flows of water and salt; the specific 
micro-decisions that produce these aggregate flows affect current net returns, but not 
dynamics or future  discounted returns. The model is therefore analogous to Baumol and 
Oates (1988)  who show that a per unit emission charge, set equal to the marginal 
external cost of emissions at  the efficient level of environmental quality, can achieve the 
efficient solution. 
With two externalities, two such prices are required, one for salt emissions and one 
for ground water extractions. Furthermore, because the aquifer state  variables depend 
only on aggregate flows, it follows that the efficient price instruments also depend on 
these flows. For policy analysis, therefore, it is convenient to specify a mathematically 
equivalent model formulated in terms of aggregate quantities, after which the micro- 
decisions can be derived. To this end, define q, = {q,,, q,, ,, q,,, ,  q,,} as basin-wide quan- 
tities for surface water imports, ground water extractions for agricultural production, 
drainage (pond)  water, and deep percolation flows in year t. 
The agricultural production problem in aggregate quantities in year t is then written 
as: 
(9)  Max n 
w,x 
where n  is defined by (1)  and associated definitions, and  is a vector of model constraints 
including land and rotation constraints and variable bounds. The solution to this 
problem defines a conditional net benefit function E(h, s,  q)  giving basin net benefits as 
a function of  the aquifer states and the vector of aggregate quantities defined above. 
This optimization problem may not be feasible for all possible combinations of the aggre- 
gate flow variables; however, this can be handled by defining the conditional net benefit 
function as negative infinity in these instances. 
With these definitions, the decision problem in year t for both common property and 
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where J(ht,  st)  = 0 for common property, J(ht,  st)  V(ht,  st)  for efficiency, and the future 
states  are  calculated from the  original equations of motion. From the  various definitions, 
it follows that the solution to this problem must be identical to that of  the original 
problems investigated earlier, and the micro-decisions for applied water w and land 
areas x can be back-calculated from the conditional optimization problem (9) given the 
solution to (10). 
With this reformulated structure, optimal regime-dependent quantity decisions are 
characterized by the first-order conditions: 
ait  ups  a~  aJ  -  +--=  -ac - 
aqs  ASY  ah  as ' 
ait  aaJ 
ait  --  ast  aJ- a  aJ  a5  a  aJ=0!  +-- 
aqgp  Asy(ht-h) as  Asy ah'  aqd  AsY  ah 
for surface water, ground water, drainage, and deep percolation, respectively (function 
arguments and time subscripts have been suppressed). These conditions have the usual 
interpretation and have been arranged whereby the terms on the left-hand side repre- 
sent marginal benefit while those on the right represent marginal cost. Recalling J  0 
for common property, it is apparent that the terms involving the partial derivatives of 
J  are ignored by users under the common property regime, thus leading to inefficiency. 
These first-order conditions extend the usual analysis (e.g., Provencher and Burt, 1993) 
to include quality considerations, although see Roseta-Palma (2002) for a somewhat 
different formulation. 
Under a decentralized common property management regime where prices can be 
charged for ground water extraction and salt disposal to the aquifer, producers maxi- 
mize: 
where pgw  and pgS  are  the prices for ground water and salt  quantities, respectively, and 
again time subscripts are suppressed. The associated first-order conditions are (after 
rearranging terms): 
ait  -  = pgw, 
aqga 
(15)  ait  +  pgsst  = pgw,  -  a5  +pg~  = 0. 
9  AsY(ht-h)  aqd 
Comparing conditions (1  I)-(  12) and conditions (14)-( 15) reveals that prices 
will induce efficiency. Substituting the original value function V for J and converting 
from salt mass to salt concentration gives: 636  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
P:"=-  --%- 
a  lav 
a  and p,g" = -  av 
A~Y  ah  ht -  a~,  ASY~,  - h)  ac,  ' 
where time subscripts have been re-inserted to emphasize the optimal prices can vary 
through time. Note, although aVlac, is invariably negative, aVlah > 0 for low hydraulic 
head and aVlah < 0 for drainage-limited conditions. Therefore, growers are charged for 
extractions and compensated for deep percolation during the Resource Extraction and 
Waste Disposal eras,  while the reverse occurs during the Drainage era. Growers always 
are charged.  for salt emissions and compensated for pond disposal. 
Figure 6 plots state-dependent optimal ground water and salt emission prices. When 
drainage is not constraining andlor salt concentrations are low, the extraction price is 
generally increasing in water table elevation. It also increases with aquifer salt concen- 
tration up to a point, after  which it decreases. The explanation for this pattern is largely 
driven by the corresponding state-dependent  levels of efficient ground water extraction. 
To save space, these are not plotted, but they are qualitatively similar to the common 
property rules discussed earlier. In particular, the benefit from either a unit increase 
in water table elevation or a unit decrease in aquifer salt concentration increases 
with the extraction rate; therefore, the optimal price is higher. Figure 6 also shows 
that under drainage-limited conditions, the extraction price decreases in water table 
elevation and eventually becomes negative. This occurs because a high saline water 
table is a liability, and hence it is necessary to charge for deep percolation flows and 
subsidize extractions. 
Salt emission prices decline with water table elevation at low salinity levels but 
increase at  high salinity levels. They also increase with salt concentration up to an 
elevation-dependent point, after which they decline. As before, this pattern is largely 
explained by the  corresponding levels of optimal ground water extraction. An additional 
consideration is the dilution effect which apparently overrides the quantity effect and 
produces the observed price decline with elevation at lower salinity levels. Figure 6 
also reports price time-series evaluated along the efficient path. The extraction price 
initially falls during the Resource Extraction era, rises during the Waste Disposal era, 
and then declines to an eventual negative level during the Drainage era as  the aquifer 
is increasingly salinized and elevated. Salt prices are generally increasing to a steady- 
state level following an initial transition period. The explanation for the time-series 
pattern follows from the considerations noted above for state-dependent prices. 
It is important to note that increasing water prices and emission costs to growers can 
have adverse equity impacts. If ground water is managed by an external entity and the 
revenue from pricing instruments leaves the region, then growers can lose in the 
aggregate (Weitzman, 1974). If the basin is managed internally for the cooperative 
benefit of the region, revenues from water pricing and emission charges can be rebated 
to growers and others impacted by prices, or used to support other public projects. As 
long as rebates are not related to charges (e.g., per acre rebates), then efficiency will be 
maintained and the  region benefits from management. This topic has received relatively 
little attention in the ground water literature (although see Feinerman and Knapp, 
1983; Burness and Brill, 2001; and Provencher and Burt, 1994). Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  637 
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Conclusions 
All economies are subject to conservation of mass and energy (Ayres and Kneese, 1969); 
however, the  implications over long time and space scales are  not often explored. Begin- 
ning with a plentiful, high-quality resource, the dynamics of  the aquifer salinization 
problem initially are  driven by resource extraction. The inevitable waste emissions back 
to the environment in conjunction with increasing extraction costs eventually result in 
waste disposal as the primary service role of the resource to the economy. Finally, a 
drainage regime stabilizes the system at  which point the economic value of the aquifer 
is  exhausted. The associated time scales are  quite long, but they are order-of-magnitude 
consistent with historical evidence on salinity  in agriculture. The primary reason for the 
long time scale is that salt quantities imported into the region in surface water are 
relatively small in comparison to the ultimate waste disposal capacity of  the aquifer. 
The applied surface water depths in the study region are representative of many other 
regions, but aquifers of  shallower depths would experience quicker build-ups. 
Economically efficient use of the resource in this model is qualitatively very similar 
to common property use. Quantitatively, efficient use maintains the aquifer at a substan- 
tially higher elevation and lower salt concentration than under common property. This 
is accomplished at first by limiting ground water withdrawals, and later by initiating 
salt disposal earlier than under common property. Notably, efficient use is achieved 
through only modest changes in the decision variables and generates significantly higher 
future annual net benefits. 
Previous studies find relatively small benefits from ground water management, 
defined as  the difference in present values of efficient and common property usage. This 
may be due to limiting ground water pumping in many areas to overlying users, imply- 
ing that ultimate resource use is based on marginal conditions, and hence average profit 
need not beand  typically is not-driven  to zero as  in a pure open-access  resource. This 
literature has focused almost exclusively on pumping  cost externalities; however, 
numerous other problems can develop, including water quality degradation. 
Intuitively, accounting for these additional inefficiencies should increase the  potential 
benefit of resource management. We did find significantly increased management bene- 
fits here; yet, somewhat surprisingly, the increase appears to be due less to salinization 
and more to other model features. This is due at least in part to discounting and the long 
time scales necessary for salinization to develop. Nevertheless, aquifer salinization does 
have dramatic implications for long-run aquifer use, so alternate discounting schemes 
and sustainability criteria which increase the visibility of  the future could potentially 
increase the importance of  salinization for overall management benefits. 
The model integrates several disparate issues in ground water economics. The early 
literature focused on pumping cost externalities; later investigations considered preven- 
tion and mitigation of  rising water tables (Knapp et al., 1990; Shah, Zilberman, and 
Lichtenberg, 1995); substantial effort has gone into managing agriculture in limited- 
drainagehigh water table regions (Dinar and Zilberman, 1991); and still others have 
considered ground water quality. At a given point in time, a region may have one or 
more of these problems but not the others. For example, the west side of the San  Joaquin 
Valley of California has severe salinityldrainage problems, while issues on the east side 
are excess pumping and falling water tables. Rather than being separate, seemingly 
unrelated problems, our analysis suggests these can be viewed instead as  different stages 
of the same overall dynamic process. Knapp and Baerenklau  Agricultural Production and Aquifer Salinization  639 
Finally, the system considered is not sustainable under either common property or 
efficient use, in the sense that income is generally declining through time. While this 
finding seems somewhat inevitable given the initial conditions, it neglects the extent to 
which resource rents might be going into capital formation that could substitute (at 
least in part) for a declining resource. This is an inherent limitation of  any partial equi- 
librium study of natural resource management for sustainability analysis. The fact that 
efficient use does not necessarily guarantee sustainability is consistent with the macro- 
environmental  literature on economic growth (Toman, Pezzey, and Krautkraemer, 1995). 
This would be a fruitful area of  future study for ground water and natural resource 
management in general. 
[Received July 2003;final revision received August 2006.1 
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